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mals. Chimpanzees are good candidates for investigating the ori-
gins of our cognitive evolution, being the closest relatives of hu-
mans among living creatures.
Recently, we found that a numerically trained chimpanzee had
a memory for numbers in several aspects similar to humans
(Kawai & Matsuzawa 2000b). The chimpanzee called Ai, has more
than 20 years of experimental experience. Prior to the memory
test, Ai learned to count dots on computer monitor or real ob-
jects and to select the corresponding Arabic numerals on a touch-
sensitive monitor (Matsuzawa 1985). Ai also learned to order the
numbers from zero to nine in sequence, regardless of the inter-in-
teger distance (Biro & Matsuzawa 1999; Tomonaga & Matsuzawa
2000). Utilizing her numerical skills, we set up a memory task. A
set of numbers (e.g., 1, 3, 4, 6, and 9) was spatially distributed on
a screen. Ai was required to touch the numbers in an ascending
order. Immediately after the selection of the lowest number (i.e.,
1), all the remaining numbers were masked by a white square.
Hence Ai had to memorize the numbers (now masked) accurately
to select the correct sequence. She reached more than 95% cor-
rect with four numbers and 65% with five, significantly above
chance in each case (17 and 4%, respectively). This indicates that
she could memorize the correct sequence of any five numbers
(Kawai & Matsuzawa 2000b).
The most interesting result concerned Ai’s response time. The
longest response times were obtained for the first number of the
sequence. Response times were shortest for the other numbers,
and did not differ from one number to another. Thus, her mean
reaction time of first response to a set size of five was 721 msec,
and then 446, 426, 466, and 41, respectively, for the remaining
four, (now masked) numbers. This pattern of responses is similar
to that of humans. For example, mean reaction times of five adult
humans in the test were 1,430, 524, 490, 741, 672 msec, for each
response, suggesting that both Ai and humans memorize the num-
bers and their locations before the first response (Biro & Mar-
suzawa 1999; Kawai, in press).
One may argue that both Ai and humans might use a rehearsal
strategy during the longest reaction time preceding the first
choice. The accuracy of humans decreased when the numbers
were masked 750 msec after the initiation of the trial. However,
Ai’s reaction times were almost half of those of humans, and they
remained approximately the same for the masked and unmasked
trials. Although rehearsal constitutes a major cause of compound
STM estimate, rehearsal was impossible because Ai’s fast reaction
times seem incompatible with rehearsal. Thus, Ai’s performance
in memorizing five items may reflect a “pure capacity limit.”
There is a possibility that other mnemonic strategies were in-
volved in the task. For instance, one might suspect that Ai used
the configuration of the numbers as possible spatial cues for re-
sponding. The procedure ruled out this possibility however, be-
cause locations were randomized across trials and all trials were
unique in each session, thereby demonstrating that long-term
memory did not contribute to the performance. In addition, a de-
tailed analysis of error trials confirmed that neither Ai nor the hu-
mans used spatial cues. The majority of errors (84.1% for Ai,
84.5% for humans) consisted in skipping one number only (e.g.,
selecting 1–3–6 instead of 1–3–4–6–9). The remaining errors
were also independent of spatial factors. Most (87.5% for Ai, and
82.0% for humans) consisted of selecting the highest number in
the sequence (i.e., 1–9 or 1–3–9 instead of 1–3–4–6–9), regard-
less of the spatial arrangement of the numbers on the screen.
These trials were regarded as showing a recency effect because
the highest numbers were the last to be processed in the pre-
planned sequence. Even more interesting, the frequency of these
last numbers was proportional to the size of the greatest number:
more errors of this type were made when the sequence contained
a 9 as the last number than when it contained an 8, and that ten-
dency remained for the lowest numbers. All these results suggest
that, like humans, Ai built up a linear representation of numbers,
from 0 to 9, and referred to it in performing the task. Similarity in
the error patterns for the two species moreover suggests that their
memory systems may share homologous mechanisms (Kawai &
Matsuzawa 2000a; in press).
Because masking occurred at the first touch, one might argue
that the memory span of the chimpanzee is four instead of five. As
demonstrated above, both Ai and the humans had already planned
their response at the onset of each trial: there is thus the possibil-
ity that the first number was included in the memorized sequence.
Even more, according to our recent test for six numbers Ai’s per-
formance was about 30%, significantly higher than the chance
level (0.8%). We do not deny the possibility that the “pure capac-
ity limit” of the chimpanzee might be less than four. Further ex-
perimental studies will be required determine this. Nevertheless,
because comparable data were obtained in Ai and the humans, our
study strongly suggests that if there are any “pure capacity limit”
differences between the two species, they should be quantitative
rather than qualitative. The essential point is that humans share
quite a similar memory process with chimpanzees.
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Abstract: Computational models of learning provide an alternative tech-
nique for identifying the number and type of chunks used by a subject in
a specific task. Results from applying CHREST to chess expertise support
the theoretical framework of Cowan and a limit in visual short-term mem-
ory capacity of 3–4 looms. An application to learning from diagrams illus-
trates different identifiable forms of chunk.
Cowan’s theoretical framework (sect. 2) assumes that the “focus of
attention is capacity-limited,” and that “deliberately recalled [in-
formation] is restricted to this limit in the focus of attention.” This
framework is compatible with the EPAM/CHREST family of
computational models, and this commentary highlights the role
that a model of learning can play in clarifying the nature of chunks.
CHREST (Chunk Hierarchy and REtrieval STructure) is a com-
putational model of expert memory in chess players (Gobet 1998;
Gobet & Simon, in press), and is based on the earlier EPAM model
(Feigenbaum & Simon 1984) of perceptual memory. CHREST
possesses an input device (simulated eye), a visual short-term
memory (STM) for storing intermediate results (equivalent to
the focus of attention), and a long-term memory (LTM) based
around a discrimination network for retrieving chunks of infor-
mation. Each chunk is learnt from information in the visual field,
using the STM to compose information across one or more eye
fixations.
The classic recall task (Chase & Simon 1973; Cowan, sect. 3.4.1;
De Groot 1946; 1978) has been used to show that subjects recall
information in chunks. The task requires the model/subject to ob-
serve a display for a set time period, and then reconstruct the stim-
ulus from memory; in simulations, the chunks within the model’s
STM are used as the reconstructed response. In a study of chess
expertise, Gobet (1998) showed how the accuracy of the recon-
structed position depends on the number and size of chunks
which the model identifies; the size of chunk depends on the level
of expertise, but the number can be systematically varied, and a
value of 3 or 4 was found to best match the performance of differ-
ent levels of player, providing further empirical support for the
findings of Cowan. Also significant is that the better performance
of experts is explained by their use of larger chunks (typically, mas-
ter chess players recall chunks of twice the size of average club
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players), and the number and content of these chunks may be ex-
tracted from the model (see also Gobet & Simon 1998; in press)
Chase and Simon (1973) did, however, find that expert chess
players appeared to recall more chunks than novices. As discussed
in Gobet and Simon (1998), these findings do not contradict the
existence of a fixed capacity limit, because additional factors affect
the subject’s performance; in this case, the number of pieces which
the player can pick up. So, are the chunks observed in the subject’s
performance due to previously learnt information or to other fac-
tors relating to the task or cognitive performance? This question
may be answered through a simulation of the learning process. The
role of learnt knowledge in producing chunks in performance is
currently being explored in a problem-solving version of CHREST
(Lane et al. 2000a) which learns a diagrammatic representation 
for solving electric circuit problems. In Lane et al. (2000b) differ-
ent computational models were analysed based on their respec-
tive representational, learning, and retrieval strategies for hand-
ling high-level information. From these two studies, it is clear that
chunks observed in the model’s performance may arise from a
number of causes. Three of the more apparent are as follows:
(1) A chunk may be observed in the output because of an ex-
plicit representation in the system’s LTM, which is the underlying
representation used in the EPAM/CHREST family of computa-
tional models. For example, Richman (1996) describe a chunk as
“any unit of information that has been familiarised and has be-
come meaningful.”
(2) A chunk may be observed in the output because the input
has matched a stored chunk based on some similarity-based crite-
rion; this is familiar from neural network approaches.
(3) A single chunk may be observed although it is based on a
functional composition/decomposition of the stimulus and its sub-
components. For example, subjects may retrieve and store multi-
ple chunks within their STM, but the performance based on these
multiple chunks may then give the appearance of a single chunk.
The presence of three distinct processes yielding chunk-like be-
haviour in such models clarifies how the observational character-
istics of chunks inter-relate with learnt knowledge, and hence clar-
ifies the connection between observed and learnt chunks. This
connection assists in developing a deeper understanding of the ca-
pacity limit, especially in areas where the subject is continuously
learning new chunks for composite objects. Most importantly,
only by modelling the entire learning history of each subject can
we really attempt to probe the content and format of chunks ma-
nipulated in STM, and thereby estimate STM capacity.
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Abstract: Measures of retrieval speed for recently presented events show
a sharp dichotomy between representations in focal attention and repre-
sentations that are recently processed but no longer attended. When in-
formation is presented over time, retrieval measures show that focal at-
tention and rapid privileged access is limited to the most recently
processed unit or chunk, not the last 3–5 chunks that Cowan estimates
from various recall procedures.
Cowan presents a diverse array of evidence to support the claim
that the focal attention has a capacity of 3–4 chunks. Much of this
evidence comes from studies examining processing limits in multi-
element displays in which all elements are simultaneously dis-
played. These studies may provide good evidence for the claim
that there is a 3-to 4-item limit on the simultaneous coding and re-
production of elements, at least in some domains. Cowan believes
the same limit holds for sequentially displayed elements, namely,
elements distributed over time rather than space. However,
Cowan’s estimates are based largely on indirect measurements.
Crucially, measures of retrieval speed from studies using sequen-
tial presentation provide direct evidence for a distinct representa-
tional state associated with the focus of attention that is limited to
the most recently processed unit. These measures indicate, con-
tra Cowan, that only one chunk is maintained across a dynamically
changing environment. One possibility is that the capacity of focal
attention differs for simultaneously available elements arrayed in
space, and for representations encountered over time. If Cowan’s
analysis is correct, perhaps we can attend to more than one si-
multaneously presented element; however, we do not appear to be
able to process more than one temporally extended event.
Cowan’s evidence. Cowan forwards, as an estimate of the ca-
pacity of focal attention, findings that the number of recalled
items often converges on 3–4. However, recall performance is de-
termined by a confluence of factors other than the capacity of fo-
cal attention. Undoubtedly, these estimates partly reflect the re-
call of representations outside focal attention, analogous to the
way that serial position functions were classically argued to reflect
output from both long-term and short-term. Further, recall is lim-
ited by forgetting that occurs over the learning phase and during
the recall process (e.g., Dosher & May1998). The number of items
recalled, even when the preconditions enumerated by Cowan
(sect. 1.2) are met, provides at best an indirect estimate of the ca-
pacity of focal attention, and is equated with focal attention pri-
marily by assumption.
Retrieval speed. The claim that focal attention is distinct from
more passive memory representations implies that information in
focal attention is accessed more immediately than information in
a passive state. Measures for access speed can provide direct evi-
dence for distinct representational states if access speed can be
measured for memories with different strengths (or probability of
access). Unfortunately, RT does not provide pure estimates of re-
trieval speed because it is affected by memory strength (e.g.,
Dosher 1984; McElree & Dosher 1989; Wickelgren et al. 1980).
However, retrieval speed can be directly measured with the re-
sponse-signal speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT) procedure. In this
procedure, subjects are cued to respond at some time after the on-
set of a test probe. With a suitable range of cue times, the full time
course of retrieval is evaluated, providing measures of when in-
formation first becomes available, the rate at which information
accrues over retrieval time, and the asymptotic level of observed
performance. The asymptote reflects the probability of retrieval,
and provides an estimate of memory strength. When accuracy de-
parts from chance, the rate at which it grows to asymptote jointly
measure retrieval speed. More accessible information should be
associated with an earlier intercept or faster rate, irrespective of
differences in asymptotic accuracy.
Wickelgren et al. (1980) used a probe recognition task to ex-
amine SAT time-course profiles for accessing representations in a
list of 16 sequentially-presented items. Asymptotic accuracy de-
creased monotonically with the decreasing recency of the tested
item, indicating that memory strength systematically declines as
time or activity is interpolated between study and test. Crucially,
however, retrieval speed was constant across all serial positions save
the last, most recently studied position. Retrieval speed was 50%
faster when no items intervened between study and test. The most
recently studied item received privileged access. This finding has
been replicated with different procedures and materials, including
a Sternberg task (McElree & Dosher 1989), a forced-choice recog-
nition task (McElree & Dosher 1993), a paired-associate recogni-
tion task (Dosher 1981), and even when the task required judging
whether a test item rhymed or was synonymous with a studied item
(McElree 1996). Related effects are found in judgments of re-
cency (McElree & Dosher 1993) and the n-back task (McElree, in
press).
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